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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Putin's State of the Union address 
In the last days before President Putin's annual address to parliament, a flurry of 
news concerned his dissatisfaction with the government's economic indicators. 
Economic Development Minister Herman Gref responded to one such report: 
"[T]he ministry does its best not to make any mistakes, but it will also do its best 
to raise the figures to which the president objects." (IZVESTIA, 13 Apr 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Gref, who is believed to have had a great deal of 
influence over important sections of the address (namely those dealing with the 
economic situation in Russia), evidently was not able to avoid such "mistakes." 
(ZAVTRA, 25 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) When Putin 
addressed the Duma subsequently, he deadpanned, "The Government is not 
reckoning on higher rates of growth. Such a low assessment of Russia's 
capabilities doesn't help the cause. Moreover, it doesn't imply active policies, and 
doesn't envisage measures designed to make use of the capabilities of the 
Russian economy." (RUSSIAN TV, 0800 GMT, 18 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) In effect, the emperor had been told he was 
wearing no clothes, to which he replied, "Yes I am, and you had better go and 
figure out what color they are." However, no one could respond to his satisfaction 
since, indeed, he was naked. Such is Russia's current situation. Putin asked his 
economic advisors to rewrite their analysis of the country's performance for the 
sake of his TV image. His advisors must be unprecedentally honest, or the 
economic statistics already are stretched too thin, since, apparently, they were 
unable to comply. 
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This episode reflects the limits on Putin's power within his own government. 
Obviously he had requested important revisions before one of his most 
publicized speeches, and his request remained unfulfilled. It indicates also that 
Putin does not wish to shoulder responsibility for growth rates that he believes to 
be too low (3.5-4.2%). By criticizing the government, Putin is trying to distance 
himself from a harsh reality. Economic Development Minister Gref may be 
serving as a lightning rod. 
 
Putin continued to address the need for administrative reform within the 
executive branch to create an apparatus that is "efficient, compact and 
functional." He emphasized that three reforms were critical to achieving this end: 
1) "a wholesale modernization of the system of executive authority"; 2) "effective 
and clear mechanisms for developing the way in which executive decisions are 
taken"; and 3) "an analysis of the state functions being carried out today, 
[retaining] only those that are necessary." With such talk of reform Putin is 
avoiding the crosshairs, referring to "elements of the executive " and "ministries." 
(RUSSIAN TV, 0800 GMT, 18 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database)  
 
In the instances cited here, Putin himself never offers any plan. He is quite 
explicit about the need for change, but never about the actual end toward which 
he is working. This is not to say that President Putin has no plan; merely that 
whatever plan he might have may never be acceptable to the Russian people. 
When the good president says, "we must substantially change the actual system 
by which state institutions operate," he means, and maybe even truly believes, 
that his own personal executive power needs to be enhanced for the good of the 
nation. 
 
Reactions not overly optimistic (except for some in the Duma) 
"The address does not contain a single new idea," Communist leader Gennady 
Zyuganov charged, "It reiterates the pro-American, pro-NATO agenda. It 
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reiterates the priorities of the liberal, hard-line, right-wing economy benefiting 
oligarchs and suchlike. It reiterates the intention to go on selling land and 
dismantle natural monopolies -- which will split the nation and the state. Integrity 
of the state, security of the population, development of science, culture, and 
education should be main topics in every address. [Putin's] speech did not 
mention a single method for implementing any of these objectives." 
 
At the other end of the political spectrum, Anatoly Chubais said, "As for a revision 
of the economic growth rate, this is an attractive idea. I'm not sure, however, that 
the regime itself understands what price it will have to pay for it. There is more to 
it than merely new laws or new decisions by the government. The president will 
have to give up his political face, his image. He will have to make some 
thoroughly unpopular decisions. I'm not sure that the regime understands this or 
is truly ready for anything like it." (GAZETA, 19 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
The newspaper Vremya novosti called the speech "the most prosaic document 
ever," and determined that it was far too boring to be leaked prior to delivery. 
However, this did not stop sycophantic reactions from within the Duma; Vremya 
notes that "the number of lawmakers who liked absolutely everything about the 
address increased."(VREMYA NOVOSTI, 19 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Izvestia pointed out that Putin's favorite phrase, "strong state," was 
not mentioned at all. (IZVESTIA, 19 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
FSB discovers Irish Republican Army weapons purchase 
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Recently it has become increasingly clear that the IRA and some of its splinter 
groups, such as the Real IRA, are not as committed to the Northern Ireland 
peace process as they should be. 
 
First, three IRA members were arrested in Bogota, Colombia, in August 2001, on 
charges of providing weapons and training to the Marxist FARC guerrillas, who 
control large sections of southern Colombia. The men are awaiting trial. More 
recently, raids on IRA safe houses carried out by police and British intelligence 
operatives uncovered IRA intelligence files which contained a target list of senior 
conservative members of parliament, and information concerning army bases 
around the United Kingdom. (BBC NEWS ONLINE, 27 Apr 02) Now it seems that 
the list should include secret attempts to purchase weapons and explosives from 
Russia, while publicly "decommissioning arms." (THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, 
28 Apr 02)  
 
According to both the Russian and British press, late in 2001 the IRA purchased 
at least 20 AN 94 assault rifles (which can fire up to 1,800 rounds a minute, and 
penetrate body armor) from "renegade Russian Special Forces Officers." (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 22 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Reportedly, 
the deal was discovered after an earlier attempt to purchase arms had been 
made, at which point the FSB passed the relevant information to the Secret 
Intelligence Service (MI6). (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 21 Apr 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) As yet, it is unclear whether any arrests have been 
made in Russia. Downing Street and the FSB have refused to comment on the 
matter. 
 
There is no indication as to what the quid pro quo for such information might be, 
especially in the current atmosphere of "cooperation" in the fight against 
terrorism, which supposedly has existed since last month's intelligence summit in 
St. Petersburg. The only return that the FSB conceivably might seek from British 
intelligence is support for the extraditions of former FSB agent Alexander 
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Litvinenko and exiled media mogul Boris Berezovsky. However, it is highly 
doubtful that the British government would agree to return either man to Moscow. 
 
And seeks to expand cooperation with CIS states 
Between 16 and 19 April, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev visited the Kyrgyz 
capital Bishkek, to hold talks with President Askar Akaev and the secretary of the 
Kyrgyz National Security Council, Misir Ashirkulov, concerning international 
terrorism and crime. (ITAR-TASS, 16 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0416, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Patrushev promised that Russia would help Kyrgyzstan to combat drug trafficking 
in the region, insisting that "Russia is no less interested than Kyrgyzstan in the 
drug threat not spreading." (ITAR-TASS, 17 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0418, via 
World News Connection) Patrushev stated that cooperation between Kyrgyzstan 
and Russia was vital, because the US had announced its intention to remain 
there only for a short term. 
 
In the wake of the comprehensive anti-terrorist exercise held in Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan between 14 and 20 April, a public relations effort has 
been launched by the FSB that is designed to ensure that security services will, 
in the words of Deputy Director Col. General Viktor Komogorov, not "lose the 
struggle against this evil of the 21st Century," and to ensure that the CIS retains 
a viable and capable anti-terrorist force. (INTERFAX, 23 Apr 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Clearly, Patrushev, and by extension, President Putin, are acting upon the 
assumption that the US may withdraw from Central Asia upon the completion of 
operations in Afghanistan, and that Russia will be able to re-establish its 
influential position. As has been made clear previously, the FSB has been given 
the task of ensuring that Russia retains influence in the region, particularly with 
regard to security. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 3 Apr 02) The events of the last 
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two weeks prove that this is indeed the case. It remains to be seen how 
successful the FSB manages to be. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
REGIONS 
Spring cleaning... 
The week of 15 - 20 April was "cleanliness week" in Rostov-on the-Don. Already 
on 10 April, thousands of city residents were busy sweeping streets, fixing up 
playgrounds, setting up trashcans, etc. Rostov Housing and Utilities Department 
Director Vladimir Artsybashev announced that the action would involve about 
40,000 persons and culminate on 20 April in a subbotnik, a traditional Soviet 
Sabbath of large-scale community service work. (REGIONS.RU NEWS, 10 Apr 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
...And spring cleansing 
At the same time, Rostov police officials are conducting a very different 
"cleaning" procedure -- Operation Foreigner, a "preventative measure aimed at 
finding and detaining illegal immigrants and preventing them from breaking the 
law." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
A similar action is taking place in neighboring Krasnodar Krai, where a new law 
restricting illegal migration was passed recently. (ITAR-TASS, 1012 GMT, 13 Apr 
02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The date also coincides with Hitler's birthday, a major event for Russian extremist 
youths whose harassment of darker-skinned foreigners from the "near abroad" 
as well as from more distant lands has alarmed residents, visitors and foreign 
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officials in Russia. All of these events are connected. First, they resonate with a 
general European zeitgeist of increasing nationalist sentiments; secondly, they 
are a result of an absence of legislation addressing domestic extremism; and 
finally, they reflect the interests of various parties. 
 
Everybody's doing it 
A number of Russian politicians have spoken about the relationship between 
Russian ultranationalists and their European counterparts. Liberal Democratic 
Party leader and State Duma Deputy Speaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky pointed to 
recent victories by a right-wing German party in a local election, to Austrian 
Freedom Party leader Joerg Haider, and the extreme-right French presidential 
candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen (to whom Zhirinovsky recently sent a 
congratulatory letter), explaining that "the future belongs to rightist, to 
nationalistic parties." (INTERFAX, 0802 GMT, 22 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0422, 
via World News Connection) 
 
State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dmitry Rogozin also mentioned 
Le Pen's advance to the runoff for the French presidency, pointing out that the 
major influx of immigrants is a primary contributing factor to the "increase in 
nationalist sentiments and the formation of skinhead organizations." (INTERFAX, 
0829 GMT, 22 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0422, via World News Connection) 
 
Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov suggested that "nationalist waves in Europe have 
been recently reaching Russia." (INTERFAX, 0844 GMT, 22 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0422, via World News Connection) And finally, Communist Party leader 
Gennady Zyuganov touched upon the international idea of neo-Nazism. He, 
however, disputed the relevance of the link, stating that Russia "has suffered 
from fascism more than any country in the world," and that, therefore, "there is no 
place for Nazism" in Russia. Zyuganov stated that the neo-Nazi ideology is 
ascribed to Russia's youths as part of a campaign aimed at creating "conditions 
that would make it possible to force on the State Duma the adoption of the bill 
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concerning the prevention of extremism," a bill that would be aimed "first of all 
against organized opposition forces." (INTERFAX, 1231 GMT, 19 Apr 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0419, via World News Connection) 
 
Maybe if we ignore it, it will go away 
In fact, there is no federal law on extremism, and it was only after last fall's 
pogrom at a Moscow market that a police department against extremism and 
terrorism was opened: the unit currently employs only about 20 persons. (REN 
TV, 18 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Russia's liberals not only blame the dearth of legislation on extremism for the 
recent problems, but also accuse the communists of stalling the process of 
developing such legislation. (ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, 17 Apr 02; What the Papers 
Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov noted that he has passed a draft 
law to the House and advocated developing a legal basis for enabling law-
enforcement bodies "to stop manifestations of extremism." Federation Council 
member Ramazan Abdulatipov said that Russia fights international terrorism but 
deals very little "with the roots of crime in our own country." (ITAR-TASS, 1456 
GMT, 18 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0418, via World News Connection) 
 
Russian officials claimed success in preventing violence in Moscow on Hitler's 
birthday. However, the interior ministry's warnings, and the superficial 
compliance of the skinheads, had no substantive effect on the situation in 
Russia. Special units patrolled football stadiums, metros, and other public places, 
as well as foreign consulates and embassies (including missions from the US, 
Japan, India, the Philippines, Italy and Sweden), which had received threats from 
the extremist organizations. (ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 16 Apr 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
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Meanwhile, many of the skinheads went south to Krasnodar Krai, where the 
weather and the reception were warmer. (INTERFAX, 19 Apr 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Out of sight... 
Immigration is a major issue in Krasnodar Krai, where legislation was passed 
recently to increase state control over migration: Foreigners are required to 
register with krai authorities, and persons illegally present on the krai's territory 
are now subject to deportation. According to officials, about a million persons 
have arrived in the region over the last decade, forcing locals out of the job 
market. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
The legislation was supported immediately by action. Within days, several 
families were forcibly deported, and it has been noted already that the victims of 
the deportations are "ethnic migrants," while numerous Slavic illegal immigrants 
are given free rein. (IZVESTIA, 15 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
According to Nezavisimaya gazeta, the new measures are supported by a 
majority of the local population. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 25 Apr 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database)  
 
In the Rostov Oblast', more liberal than its southwestern neighbor and 
considered less likely to adopt equally stringent legislation, settlement by ethnic 
minorities -- currently at 16% -- also affects internal politics. (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 12 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The Don Cossacks 
have volunteered to take the "restoration of the ethnic balance" into their own 
hands. The Cossacks accuse Chechen, Ingush, Chinese, Roma and Azeri 
groups of "ethnic aggression" and plan to send Russian President Vladimir Putin 
an open letter requesting a meeting to discuss the issue. (VREMYA NOVOSTI, 
17 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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While Russia's southern regions are particularly prone to endorsing the 
suppression of ethnic minorities, according to the VTsIOM Public Opinion 
Research Center, 58% of the Russian population nationwide supported the 
slogan of "Russia for the Russians." This number has risen steadily from 49% in 
2000 and 43% in 1998. (IZVESTIA, 19 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
...Out of mind 
With the lack of legislation and the encouragement of national sentiments by 
various political forces, actions by extremist youths in effect are condoned. The 
17 April vandalism at an Armenian cemetery in Krasnodar, especially painful to 
the local Armenian community as it came just two weeks before the Day of 
Remembrance of the Dead, was officially condemned. (INTERFAX, 0818 GMT, 
18 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0418, via World News Connection) However, no 
action was taken by the authorities.  
 
Similarly, while 392 members of extremist youth organizations were detained, 
and 198 described as "deserving close attention," only two criminal cases were 
initiated against the skinheads since the offenses "were not committed in public 
places and did not take the form of large-scale street rallies." (INTERFAX, 0902 
GMT, 25 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0425, via World News Connection) 
 
A journalist from the popular daily Moskovsky komsomolets (owned by Moscow 
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and recognized for the attention it devotes to the actions of 
nationalists) reported that she infiltrated an extremist organization and made two 
fascinating discoveries: First of all, the nationalist actions were planned not on 
the anniversary of Hitler's birthday, but on the anniversary of his death; and 
second, the skinheads are trained at a special-purpose police [OMON] center in 
the Moscow area. (EKHO MOSKVY, 23 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
A new Axis? 
Russia President Vladimir Putin has met with Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi four times during the past six weeks, both in formal and informal 
sessions. Since Berlusconi's election in 2001 and his focus on increased 
economic growth and defense (and subsequent decreased focus on social 
issues), Italy's status in Europe has grown. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Feb 02; 
via nytimes.com) The prime minister has widened Italy's reach on international 
issues. Berlusconi has long championed the Russian cause among European 
powers and was among the first to endorse a more extensive relationship 
between NATO and Russia, as proposed by NATO Secretary-General George 
Robertson and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 28 
Nov 01) In addition, starting in the Fall of 2001, Berlusconi established regular 
dialogue with Putin, discussing a range of topics including the war on terrorism, 
increased economic cooperation between Europe and Russia, and closer 
Russian-Italian ties. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 13 Apr 02; via yahoonews.com) 
 
The current round of Russian-Italian meetings began with a series of informal 
discussions on the Middle East, the war against terrorism, and Iraq. [RUSSIA 
PUBLIC TV (ORT), 1700 GMT, 2 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database] A 
prepared set of statements and a press conference held by the two leaders 
confirmed that "[Prime Minister Berlusconi] like President Putin does not imagine 
a united Europe without Russia and is prepared to do anything possible to fully 
integrate Russia into the European economy." (RUSSIA TV, 1300 GMT, 2 Apr 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) This kind of support is crucial for 
increased Russian economic relations with the European Union. Other European 
states, such as France and Germany, have expressed reluctance to increase 
commercial ties with Russia because of questions about the strength of the 
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Russian economy, lack of significant political and judicial reform, and its ongoing 
war in Chechnya. (REUTERS, 10 Apr 02; via yahoonews.com) 
 
Berlusconi apparently has decided to play a major role in finalizing a formal 
agreement between Russia and NATO. The initial discussions between Putin 
and the Italian prime minister on this issue were concluded in Moscow on 3-4 
April. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12 Apr 02; via yahoonews.com) 
 
What has yet to be clarified is the method of choosing which issues will be on the 
agenda for the proposed new NATO-Russia group (the "Twenty") and what force 
the resulting decisions made will have. A joint Russia-EU summit is to take place 
on 29 May, and could provide additional details about the future of economic 
relations between the European Union and Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1508 GMT, 18 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
It appears that Vladimir Putin's carefully laid groundwork is about to pay off: Putin 
and his foreign policy team (including both Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov), seeking further integration with NATO and 
closer economic ties with Europe, have held several high-level meetings in 
Europe and regular exchanges with NATO since 11 September. The final details 
of the new NATO-Russia association will be made public during a meeting on 28 
May. The future of the EU-Russia relationship remains to be seen. 
 
Closer ties with Iran 
Putin and Co. have labored over the last year to forge even closer ties with Iran. 
Russia has entered into major arms deals with Iran and has contracted to build at 
least one and perhaps two nuclear reactors there. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 
27 Feb 02) 
 
Moreover, the Russians have favored the Palestinians, bringing Tehran and 
Moscow even closer. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi confirmed the 
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increasingly warm relationship between the two countries during a recent trip to 
Moscow. Though the focus of the visit was to confirm Russia's support for Iran 
and discuss their mutual interests in the Caspian Sea area, there was plenty of 
opportunity for anti-American rhetoric. 
 
"The proclamation by Washington of an 'axis of evil', to which Iran was linked, is 
just a sign showing that the new doctrine of a uni-polar world has begun to 
operate," Kharrazi noted. (ITAR-TASS, 2055 GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) At the same time, Kharrazi made it clear who Iran's friends 
are: "Fortunately, the European Union, Russia, and China oppose such a 
doctrine." 
 
The Iranian foreign minister also took the opportunity to blast the US presence in 
Central Asia saying, "The US presence in Central Asia will not help the security 
situation there . Central Asian Nations have an obligation to effect their own 
security." (ITAR-TASS, 1822 GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Official Russia has not echoed these fears, and in fact has expressed 
muted support for the US activities in the region, perhaps because Moscow has 
continued to be consulted on troop levels and basing in post-Soviet republics. 
 
Kharrazi conveyed the impression of Russo-Iranian entente over the Caspian: 
"The Caspian Sea should be a sea of peace and friendship with all littoral areas 
and states having equal access to its resources," he said. (ITAR-TASS, 1822 
GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) He claimed that the existing 
Caspian treaties, signed by Iran and the Soviet Union, are effective but require 
modification and improvement over time to maintain their effectiveness. (ITAR-
TASS, 1822 GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Just what such 
modifications would entail, of course, has been the subject of intense debate 
among the littoral states that achieved independence after the treaties were 
signed. In effect, Moscow and Tehran coordinated positions in the run up to the 
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Caspian Summit, so that Moscow would appear conciliatory, while Iran blocked 
progress. 
 
Indeed, Kharrazi signaled that all was well with Russian-Iranian endeavors, 
including ventures that seemed at risk recently. Despite rumors that both sides 
were dissatisfied with the progress and were preparing to pull out, he stated that 
"Russia and Iran have the opportunity to expand cooperation, including the 
completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr." (ITAR-TASS, 1822 GMT, 4 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The official Iranian news agency 
echoed that assurance. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1630 
GMT, 20 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
State of the Nation address -- foreign policy issues 
During his State of the Nation address on 18 April, Vladimir Putin did not tackle 
much of the foreign policy agenda for the coming year. However, he did highlight 
two major issues as priorities of the Russian government. 
 
First, he outlined the importance of Russian participation in the global 
marketplace. "Competition has now assumed a genuinely global character. 
Owing to our weaknesses we have had to yield to others our numerous niches in 
the world marketsit is we ourselves who have to fight to regain our place in the 
economic sunlight." (RUSSIA TV, 0800 GMT, 18 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) One of the Soviet Union's key exports has continued to be 
military hardware; under Putin, Russia has made every effort to capture as much 
of that market as possible. These efforts have been successful in the Middle 
East, Asia and even South America. Though military hardware is not the only 
market Russia can and will pursue, it offers the best chance at hard cash.  
 
Putin also addressed Russia's desire to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Many of his critics in Russia have accused him of viewing WTO 
membership as a panacea for the country's economic ills. Putin made it clear that 
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the WTO is a means to an end rather than an end unto itself. "I would like to state 
the WTO is not an absolute evil or an absolute good. It is not a reward for good 
behaviorthe WTO is a toolthe problem is that our country is currently excluded 
from making the rules of world trade," he explained. (RUSSIA TV, 0800 GMT, 18 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
While Putin spent some time describing the progress made in the war on 
terrorism and the role Russia has played in the alliance, the focus of the speech 
was on domestic political issues. Thus, the future of Russian foreign policy is still 
murky. However, President Putin did emphasize a major component of external 
relations -- the economic aspect.A new Axis? 
 
Russia President Vladimir Putin has met with Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi four times during the past six weeks, both in formal and informal 
sessions. Since Berlusconi's election in 2001 and his focus on increased 
economic growth and defense (and subsequent decreased focus on social 
issues), Italy's status in Europe has grown. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 13 Feb 02; 
via nytimes.com) The prime minister has widened Italy's reach on international 
issues. Berlusconi has long championed the Russian cause among European 
powers and was among the first to endorse a more extensive relationship 
between NATO and Russia, as proposed by NATO Secretary-General George 
Robertson and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 28 
Nov 01) In addition, starting in the Fall of 2001, Berlusconi established regular 
dialogue with Putin, discussing a range of topics including the war on terrorism, 
increased economic cooperation between Europe and Russia, and closer 
Russian-Italian ties. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 13 Apr 02; via yahoonews.com) 
 
The current round of Russian-Italian meetings began with a series of informal 
discussions on the Middle East, the war against terrorism, and Iraq. [RUSSIA 
PUBLIC TV (ORT), 1700 GMT, 2 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database] A 
prepared set of statements and a press conference held by the two leaders 
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confirmed that "[Prime Minister Berlusconi] like President Putin does not imagine 
a united Europe without Russia and is prepared to do anything possible to fully 
integrate Russia into the European economy." (RUSSIA TV, 1300 GMT, 2 Apr 
02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) This kind of support is crucial for 
increased Russian economic relations with the European Union. Other European 
states, such as France and Germany, have expressed reluctance to increase 
commercial ties with Russia because of questions about the strength of the 
Russian economy, lack of significant political and judicial reform, and its ongoing 
war in Chechnya. (REUTERS, 10 Apr 02; via yahoonews.com) 
 
Berlusconi apparently has decided to play a major role in finalizing a formal 
agreement between Russia and NATO. The initial discussions between Putin 
and the Italian prime minister on this issue were concluded in Moscow on 3-4 
April. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12 Apr 02; via yahoonews.com) 
 
What has yet to be clarified is the method of choosing which issues will be on the 
agenda for the proposed new NATO-Russia group (the "Twenty") and what force 
the resulting decisions made will have. A joint Russia-EU summit is to take place 
on 29 May, and could provide additional details about the future of economic 
relations between the European Union and Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1508 GMT, 18 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
It appears that Vladimir Putin's carefully laid groundwork is about to pay off: Putin 
and his foreign policy team (including both Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov), seeking further integration with NATO and 
closer economic ties with Europe, have held several high-level meetings in 
Europe and regular exchanges with NATO since 11 September. The final details 
of the new NATO-Russia association will be made public during a meeting on 28 
May. The future of the EU-Russia relationship remains to be seen. 
 
Closer ties with Iran 
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Putin and Co. have labored over the last year to forge even closer ties with Iran. 
Russia has entered into major arms deals with Iran and has contracted to build at 
least one and perhaps two nuclear reactors there. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 
27 Feb 02) 
 
Moreover, the Russians have favored the Palestinians, bringing Tehran and 
Moscow even closer. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi confirmed the 
increasingly warm relationship between the two countries during a recent trip to 
Moscow. Though the focus of the visit was to confirm Russia's support for Iran 
and discuss their mutual interests in the Caspian Sea area, there was plenty of 
opportunity for anti-American rhetoric. 
 
"The proclamation by Washington of an 'axis of evil', to which Iran was linked, is 
just a sign showing that the new doctrine of a uni-polar world has begun to 
operate," Kharrazi noted. (ITAR-TASS, 2055 GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) At the same time, Kharrazi made it clear who Iran's friends 
are: "Fortunately, the European Union, Russia, and China oppose such a 
doctrine." 
 
The Iranian foreign minister also took the opportunity to blast the US presence in 
Central Asia saying, "The US presence in Central Asia will not help the security 
situation there . Central Asian Nations have an obligation to effect their own 
security." (ITAR-TASS, 1822 GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Official Russia has not echoed these fears, and in fact has expressed 
muted support for the US activities in the region, perhaps because Moscow has 
continued to be consulted on troop levels and basing in post-Soviet republics.  
 
Kharrazi conveyed the impression of Russo-Iranian entente over the Caspian: 
"The Caspian Sea should be a sea of peace and friendship with all littoral areas 
and states having equal access to its resources," he said. (ITAR-TASS, 1822 
GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) He claimed that the existing 
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Caspian treaties, signed by Iran and the Soviet Union, are effective but require 
modification and improvement over time to maintain their effectiveness. (ITAR-
TASS, 1822 GMT, 4 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Just what such 
modifications would entail, of course, has been the subject of intense debate 
among the littoral states that achieved independence after the treaties were 
signed. In effect, Moscow and Tehran coordinated positions in the run up to the 
Caspian Summit, so that Moscow would appear conciliatory, while Iran blocked 
progress. 
 
Indeed, Kharrazi signaled that all was well with Russian-Iranian endeavors, 
including ventures that seemed at risk recently. Despite rumors that both sides 
were dissatisfied with the progress and were preparing to pull out, he stated that 
"Russia and Iran have the opportunity to expand cooperation, including the 
completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr." (ITAR-TASS, 1822 GMT, 4 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The official Iranian news agency 
echoed that assurance. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1630 
GMT, 20 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
State of the Nation address -- foreign policy issues 
During his State of the Nation address on 18 April, Vladimir Putin did not tackle 
much of the foreign policy agenda for the coming year. However, he did highlight 
two major issues as priorities of the Russian government. 
 
First, he outlined the importance of Russian participation in the global 
marketplace. "Competition has now assumed a genuinely global character. 
Owing to our weaknesses we have had to yield to others our numerous niches in 
the world marketsit is we ourselves who have to fight to regain our place in the 
economic sunlight." (RUSSIA TV, 0800 GMT, 18 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) One of the Soviet Union's key exports has continued to be 
military hardware; under Putin, Russia has made every effort to capture as much 
of that market as possible. These efforts have been successful in the Middle 
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East, Asia and even South America. Though military hardware is not the only 
market Russia can and will pursue, it offers the best chance at hard cash. 
 
Putin also addressed Russia's desire to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Many of his critics in Russia have accused him of viewing WTO 
membership as a panacea for the country's economic ills. Putin made it clear that 
the WTO is a means to an end rather than an end unto itself. "I would like to state 
the WTO is not an absolute evil or an absolute good. It is not a reward for good 
behaviorthe WTO is a toolthe problem is that our country is currently excluded 
from making the rules of world trade," he explained. (RUSSIA TV, 0800 GMT, 18 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
While Putin spent some time describing the progress made in the war on 
terrorism and the role Russia has played in the alliance, the focus of the speech 
was on domestic political issues. Thus, the future of Russian foreign policy is still 
murky. However, President Putin did emphasize a major component of external 
relations -- the economic aspect. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces and Military-
Industrial Complex 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Leadership, education or more hardware? 
Following Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's recent inspection of the 
Moscow Military District, part of a nationwide evaluation conducted over the last 
year, he said the picture is not too bleak. "I don't consider the situation in the 
army as being hopeless, though the plight of military units and fleets, which I 
have already visited, differs depending on commanders' skills," Ivanov stated. 
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(GAZETA, 24 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
 
He also met with officers, who reportedly complained about the quality of basic 
military training. Their concerns ranged from the study of obsolete military 
hardware to the outdated combat tactics used during WWII. 
 
However, Ivanov reported, "The main problems of the Army and the Navy are 
connected with rearmament. Weapons and military hardware used by the Army 
were created in the 1970s and 1980s. However, it is impossible to replace 
everything [at once]. Some weapons can be used for several more years." It is 
the defense minister's responsibility to "keep the balance of the social status of 
servicemen, their money allowances, and realize the [modernization and 
acquisition of new] armament program[s]," he said. "In such circumstances, the 
situation will slowly improve." (GAZETA, 24 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) 
 
Priorities, priorities 
Thus, Ivanov stated fairly concisely what his competing priorities were, and 
acknowledged that it would take some time to make all the needed changes. 
Perhaps, Ivanov will not fall for the notion that rearmament will solve all of the 
military's other problems. New equipment without the resources to maintain or 
operate it (such as tanks without fuel) will not address the armed forces' social, 
educational, leadership, readiness and training funding problems. 
 
Especially interesting, however, is the realization by the younger officers that an 
overwhelming part of what they are learning is "obsolete." Perhaps access to the 
Internet, and an overall more "worldly wise" and skeptical generation will force 
the acceleration of the military educational system's overhaul. Although modern 
military theory has its roots in previous military campaigns, proportional amounts 
of time must be spent on current and future warfare tactics and innovations. 
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Alternative service debate continues 
While there are still many opposing views concerning the ideal time requirements 
of military and alternative service, the consensus seems to be developing that 
the latter should be longer. Tiring of the nearly nine-year debate, senior military 
officials from the General Staff just want the Duma to specify the length of 
service requirements and the application procedures for alternative (non-military) 
service. But it is not that simple.  
 
The real issue is how long is enough? The more liberal Union of Right Forces 
proposes one year of alternative service, or a six-month military service 
commitment. This is unrealistic. One could even argue that the existing two-year 
military service commitment isn't sufficient, given the time needed to train 
recruits. 
 
More of the same 
If the solution isn't found soon to the alternative service issues, then desertion 
and draft evasion will continue to erode Russian society's perception of the 
military. The armed forces spring recruitment is best described as "disastrous." 
According to sources in the military and registration offices, the number of 
recruits is expected to be only 11.7% of the total registered for the draft. An 
analysis of those recruited shows that one out of every five is either from a 
single-parent dysfunctional home, uses alcohol or drugs, or only has primary 
school education -- not exactly ideal hands to be entrusted with modern 
weapons. (NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIE, 17 Apr 02; What the 
Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
One serious consideration will have to be the elimination of college deferments. 
Another option well within the military's existing capabilities is to clean up the 
rampant hazing, and other criminal disciplinary excesses prevailing today. The 
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caliber of Russian recruits, after all, is the foundation upon which the military 
forces are built. 
 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Bartering away more Russian debt at what cost? 
On 16 April the Russian and Czech governments signed a long-awaited 
agreement to settle the outstanding Russian debt to Czechoslovakia. The $400 
million debt will be met by the sale of three Russian-Ukrainian built An-70 
military-transport planes, seven Mi-24 combat helicopters, and miscellaneous 
spare parts for existing Soviet and Russian military hardware used by the Czech 
military. Reportedly, the AN-70 transport planes had been slated to go to the 
Russian Air Force. (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 17 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) 
 
This is yet another example of the difficult balancing acts facing Moscow: Pay off 
costly debt (receive no cash for the sale, but reduce cash expenditures servicing 
foreign debts), sell military hardware for export and receive cash to bolster the 
defense industry (and perhaps meet payroll demands), or replace aging aircraft 
within the Russian Air Force all difficult choices. Given the current politico-military 
situation in Russia, paying off the debt probably was a good decision, since 
Russia is in no immediate need of new transport aircraft or additional combat 
helicopters. 
 
India, what's the rush? 
As tensions flare up along the Indian-Pakistan border, it may be Russian and 
Ukrainian tanks that wind up confronting each other. Indian Defense Minister 
George Fernandez 
 
recently met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to discuss future 
Indian purchases of Russian military equipment. Fernandez signed a preliminary 
agreement for India to purchase 310 T-90S tanks for $800 million in response to 
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Pakistan's decision to purchase 320 T-84UD tanks from Ukraine. Fernandez 
expressed his hope that "there are no obstacles to this contract, and we hope 
that tanks will be shipped on time. We will be glad if the tanks are sent to India 
ahead of the schedule in April [2002]." (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 17 Apr 02; What the 
Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
The Indian contract is good news for the Uralvagonzavod plant, since funding to 
build new tanks for the Russian Army has not materialized. But India has its eyes 
set on fighter aircraft as well. Fernandez expressed his hopes that the Irkutsk 
aviation plant can speed up delivery of SU-30MKI fighters currently under 
contract.  
 
Joint Russian-Indian military ventures, such as the development and production 
of the Brahmos supersonic anti-ship missile, have proven successful. The 
Brahmos missile is being featured on the international military arms-show circuit. 
The Russian military-industrial complex is also looking for partners to share in the 
funding and development for the Sukhoi design bureau's fifth generation fighter, 
and India may be that potential partner. (VREMYA, 15 Apr 02; What the Papers 
Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Little international will for fight over Gongadze 
In mid-April, four journalist organizations appealed to the Council of Europe to 
increase its pressure on Ukraine to investigate further the circumstances behind 
the murder of their colleague, Georgiy Gongadze. There has been no response 
so far from the CE, and it is doubtful that anything significant will be forthcoming. 
It appears that President Leonid Kuchma and his allies have been successful in 
 24 
blocking the efforts of Gongadze's widow, media and human rights organizations 
to have his death openly investigated. It also appears, based on recent events, 
that the administration's intimidation and repression of the media in Ukraine is 
continuing unabated. 
 
Kuchma's latest success in thwarting efforts to examine the Gongadze murder (in 
which allegedly he is implicated) came earlier this month when his administration 
blocked the FBI from examining evidence gathered during the initial investigation. 
The bureau had been invited very publicly to advise and assist the prosecutor-
general's office on the case and earlier had participated in identifying Gongadze's 
remains. In fact, over the last year, prosecutors routinely referred to their request 
for assistance from the FBI as evidence that they were working diligently to solve 
the murder. On 17 September 2001, for example, when asked about progress on 
the case, Deputy Prosecutor-General Olexiy Baganets trumpeted the impending 
arrival of the FBI. "A group of FBI experts would already be in Ukraine if the 
tragedy had not hit the US," he explained. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 17 Sep 
01; via lexis-nexis) Unfortunately, Mr. Baganets neglected to mention that when 
these experts did arrive, they wouldn't be allowed to do anything. 
 
On 16 April, the US Embassy in Ukraine revealed that the FBI had left Ukraine 
after being blocked from assisting in the investigation. According to a statement 
released by the embassy, the four FBI representatives were told that Ukrainian 
law prohibits prosecutors from releasing any information to them. They were 
"unable to discuss any aspects of the case, share evidence or conduct a joint site 
inspection," the statement said. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 17 Apr 02; via lexis-
nexis) Baganets confirmed this information when questioned. "We provided them 
with material that is no longer an investigation secret as under international and 
Ukrainian law we cannot share information that constitutes an investigation 
secret," he said. (INTERFAX, 16 Apr 02; via lexis-nexis) Baganets did not identify 
the laws about which he was speaking. And up to this point, no one seems to 
know. 
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Following the release of the US Embassy statement, Myroslava Gongadze, 
Georgiy's widow, told Radio Liberty that Ukrainian law "allows for bilateral 
agreements. International law enforcement officials -- if they have been invited 
into the country -- are subject to the same laws as the Ukrainian prosecutor 
general." Baganets justification for non-cooperation, she said, "is simply not true." 
(RADIO LIBERTY, 18 Apr 02; via www.rferl.org, and follow-up interview with 
author, 23 Apr 02) 
 
The justification certainly won't impress US National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice, who in March discussed the FBI's anticipated involvement in 
the Gongadze case during an interview with Kyiv-based 1+1 television. "We have 
a team of FBI experts who will go to Ukraine in April to assist the investigation," 
she said. "We have said very clearly that we are ready to help anyone in the 
Ukrainian government to complete this investigation. We are certain that this is a 
case that will affect the climate of Ukrainian-US relations. Therefore, we [will] 
provide political and technical assistance to ensure an open investigation." (ONE 
PLUS ONE, 1730 GMT, 4 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Even though Rice is likely to be irritated by the FBI's treatment in Ukraine, it is 
doubtful that the US will respond with any vigor, at least publicly. The advances 
made by reformers in the 31 March parliamentary elections (after Rice's 
interview) have provided the US with an unexpected "light at the end of the 
tunnel." When Kuchma's final term ends in a little over two years, a reformer 
realistically could win the presidency -- a potential outcome that did not appear at 
all likely before the elections. The Gongadze case, therefore, ironically seems to 
have become a casualty of reformist success. In the grand scheme of 
geopolitics, justice for Georgiy Gongadze simply is not a compelling enough 
reason to continue confronting an obstinate, out-of-touch, weakened regime. This 
is particularly true when the possibility of success is so remote, and when 
Kuchma's domestic opponents are doing a good job of debilitating him for you. 
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Instead, the US probably will try to encourage reform while waiting for Kuchma to 
go -- a delicate mix of hands-on, but hands-off.  
 
This "wait for Kuchma to go" strategy seemingly is also being embraced by the 
Council of Europe. Despite significant attention to the Gongadze case by the 
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), the Council of Ministers -- which embodies 
what limited legal authority exists in the CE -- has taken no action. 
 
On 27 September 2001, PACE recommended that the Council of Ministers "set 
up an independent commission of enquiry including international investigators for 
this purpose, and ask the governments of the member states of the Council of 
Europe to propose assistance by their investigators." (PACE 
RECOMMENDATION 1538, 27 Sep 02) In December, however, Council of 
Ministers President Antanas Valionis met with Ukrainian lawmakers investigating 
the Gongadze case and chose not to suggest an international inquiry. (ITAR-
TASS, 8 Dec 02; via lexis-nexis) At the time, it was privately suggested that the 
CE would monitor the success of the FBI before making any decisions. Now, 
given the non-cooperation of Ukrainian officials and the clock ticking down on 
Kuchma, it would seem unlikely that Valionis will take any action. 
 
Still, Gongadze's widow and colleagues recently made what may be one final 
attempt to have his case investigated. On 12 April, the International Federation of 
Journalists, the National Union of Journalists, Reporters Without Borders and the 
Institute of Mass Information of Ukraine sent a letter to Valionis. In it, the groups 
asked him "without further delay and in accordance with the Parliamentary 
Assembly's recommendation 1538 (2001), to ask member countries formally to 
send investigators to participate in the inquiry." (12 Apr 02; via National Union of 
Journalists) In a clear sign of the current atmosphere, while the letter received 
some attention in Ukraine, it barely registered in the West. 
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Although it is distressing that Gongadze's murder probably will not be solved (at 
least during Kuchma's term in office), the most dangerous side effect of the 
failure to pursue the investigation is the sense of impunity it bestows on 
administration officials. "[Reopening the investigation] is not only about the 
Gongadze case," Myroslava Gongadze said in a 3 April interview with this writer. 
"It's for all journalists who are under pressure now." (See PERSPECTIVE, 16 Apr 
02) And there are many. Since 1998, 11 journalists have been killed and 48 
severely injured in unexplained attacks. (REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS 
STATEMENT, 18 Apr 02) But it seems that the administration's success in 
staving off a Gongadze investigation has emboldened it. Media intimidation has 
become more public and less apologetic in the last year. The persecution of Oleh 
Lyashko is a case in point. 
 
And then there was Lyashko . . . 
On 11 April, the Cherkasy Regional Prosecutor's Office ordered the arrest of 
Oleh Lyashko for allegedly obstructing a police investigation of him. The editor-
in-chief of the Svoboda newspaper is accused of libeling an as-yet-unnamed 
public official. Not coincidentally, Lyashko is associated with Yulia Tymoshenko 
and has written a number of articles critical of former Prosecutor-General 
Mykhaylo Potebenko. Even more important, Lyashko announced in Svoboda on 
27 March that he had written a "32-page booklet" called "Secrets of the 
Prosecutor-General" based on "a two-year journalistic investigation." Lyashko 
complained that his attempts to publish the booklet had failed and noted that "the 
Svoboda editorial office is still looking for a publisher that would agree to print" 
the material. (SVOBODA, 27 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database)  
 
Officials apparently heard of the booklet on 23 March, when Lyashko took it to a 
local printing house. Shortly after, the printing house refused to publish the 
material, while police confiscated the entire 107,000-copy run of Svoboda and 
dumped it into the river. The next day, 30 police officers searched Svoboda's 
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offices and printing house. Lyashko was then questioned several times, ordered 
to turn himself in (he refused), and finally arrested on 15 April. 
 
The journalist is no stranger to the Ukrainian justice system; Lyashko first was 
arrested on a libel charge in 1997 and acquitted in 1999. But like many cases 
against journalists, a Kyiv appeals court overturned the acquittal in June of 2001 
and attempted to bar Lyashko from working as a journalist. Reporters Without 
Borders responded sharply. "To forbid a journalist to carry out his professional 
duties is unacceptable. Only Iran and Yemen have so far resorted to similar 
punishment," the organization pointed out in a statement. (UNIAN, 1536 GMT, 15 
Jun 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Charges were 
dismissed suddenly and inexplicably several months later. On 24 January 2002, 
however, the reporter was physically attacked in Kyiv as he was registering for 
his unsuccessful run in the parliamentary elections.  
 
Following this latest arrest on 15 April, Lyashko remained in detention for eight 
days. He was released after vigorous protests from several media organizations 
and the possibility of a PACE resolution over the case. One day later, the 
Cherkasy Regional Court of Appeals dismissed all charges against him. Whether 
that will be the end of the case is the question, of course, but it is doubtful. 
 
Throughout this latest media affair, the prosecutor-general's office seemed 
unconcerned about the negative responses being generated by its continuing 
harassment of Lyashko. Clearly, the office -- now under the control of former 
Potebenko deputy Olexiy Baganets -- has little regard for either domestic or 
international opinion. But then, why should it? No official from the prosecutor's 
office has ever been held responsible for his actions. The Kuchma 
administration's sense of impunity has been well earned. Consequently, today in 
Ukraine, the Gongadze murder remains unsolved, Oleh Lyashko must always 
look over his shoulder, and the rest of the journalists in the country -- who 
normally lose two colleagues to unsolved homicide each year -- remain at the 
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mercy of the prosecutor-general. Unfortunately, there seems little possibility that 
this will change -- at least before the 2004 presidential election. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Khattab dead? 
The FSB and Chechen websites are reporting that Khattab was given a poisoned 
letter on 18 March, the vapors of which killed him; he was buried in secrecy in the 
mountains in Chechnya. The burial was filmed to show his family that the proper 
rites had been observed. The FSB came into possession of the tape when one of 
Khattab's bodyguards, Esli Ryzhyi, was killed by the federal forces during a 
cleansing. (KOMMERSANT, 29 Apr 02) These details seem to confirm FSB 
Spokesman Alexander Zdanovich's 25 April contention that Khattab had been 
killed. 
 
Initially many experts approached with caution the Moscow news broadcast that 
Khattab had been killed. No one has seen Khattab's body. He had been dead for 
over a month, yet no one in Chechnya, in the Russian military or among the 
Chechen resistance, noticed. 
 
So when Alexander Zdanovich announced on 25 April that Khattab had been 
killed in a special operation, even the Russian president sounded skeptical. "If he 
was really destroyed, this certainly is another blow for the terrorists," Vladimir 
Putin said. "At least, I believe that such will be the fate of all those terrorists. I 
have no doubt of that." (ORT, 25 Apr 02; BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database)  
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On 18 March Russian wire services reported that Khattab's communications had 
not been detected in four months and he was presumed dead and buried in a 
cave. The propaganda organ linked to Khattab, kavkaz.org, explained that he 
had simply upgraded his communications technology. Then, on 11 April, 
anonymous sources in the FSB were quoted as saying Khattab "apparently has 
been liquidated." (KOMMERSANT, 26 Apr 02) 
 
Chechen OMON members were not persuaded by Zdanovich but also could not 
be certain about Khattab's whereabouts. According to OMON Commander Musa 
Gazimagomadov, for a long time neither Basaev nor Khattab has been in 
Chechnya. They are represented by "naibs" or lieutenants. The head of the 
Chechen special forces, Dzhabrail Yamadaev, has a different opinion: "Khattab is 
probably in Chechnya, all our information points in that direction. But if he was 
killed, it would be this way, by accident. To mount an operation to kill him is 
virtually impossible." (KOMMERSANT, 26 Apr 02) 
 
Aslan Maskhadov's representative, Mairbek Vachagaev, puts forward another 
possibility: "In my view, the Federal Security Service is unable to find out his 
whereabouts and is trying to force him to appear on air. This is the only way to 
explain the diligence with which the FSB is trying to prove that Khattab is dead." 
(EKHO MOSKVY, 25 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Another 
possibility is that the false news and perhaps a doctored tape allowed Khattab to 
slip away. As Kommersant commented on 29 April, several of his lieutenants 
have been killed recently. Khattab must have felt a noose tightening, and "death 
and with it an end to investigations seemed to him the best option." 
(KOMMERSANT, 29 Apr 02) 
 
but Abu Valid lives 
On 17 April the director of the Border Guards, Konstantin Totsky, acknowledged 
that the wreckage of one of the helicopters, the Mi-24 that had been lost over 
Chechnya on 3 February, had been found. However, the federals found no 
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bodies. Chechen intermediaries reported the identification of some crew 
members and sought to trade the bodies for Chechen civilians held in detention. 
Totsky said that he was ready to begin negotiations but could not reach Abu 
Valid, Khattab's naib -- now, apparently, his successor. (gazeta.ru, 17 Apr 02) 
 
GEORGIA 
Georgia braces for more blows 
Since Russia's incursion into the Kodori Gorge on 11-14 April, the situation has 
not stabilized. The Russian "peacekeepers" insist on the right to "patrol" the 
Kodori Gorge on their own, without so much as the minimal presence of the UN 
observers (UNOMIG). Some Georgian leaders, such as Nodar Natadze, the 
head of the Georgian National Front, say that two divisions of the Russian 58th 
army have arrived in Abkhazia. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 25 Apr 02) 
 
President Eduard Shevardnadze sought to allay fears of escalation at a 19 April 
press conference, addressing his remarks to those Abkhaz who might be 
watching: "We want all this to end peacefully. I would like to tell them 
unambiguously that we have no plans to carry out an attack and we have no 
plans to launch new operations." (GEORGIAN TELEVISION, 19 Apr 02; BBC, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Russian spokesmen claim that the troop movements in Abkhazia constitute 
rotation, not escalation. Two armored personnel carriers arrived, and two will be 
removed. Similarly, the paratroopers are being replaced by motorized riflemen. 
"Peacekeeping" operations had been carried out by paratroopers but are now the 
duty of regular army, and similar rotations did indeed occur in Kosovo along with 
other relocations of Russian peacekeepers. (AVN, 19 Apr 02; BBC, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) The UN military observers certified after a patrol 
that no unusual troop buildup was occurring. (KAVKASSIA PRESS, 19 Apr 02; 
BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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This was contradicted a day later by two Georgian officials. The deputy secretary 
of the Security Council, Jemal Gakhokidze, characterized the position of the 
Russian "peacekeepers" as "radical" and repeated that a buildup had been 
observed. (RUSTAVI-2, 20 Apr 02; BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
The chairman of the parliamentary defense committee, Gia Baramidze, speaking 
on state television, went further. "I had a conversation with Dieter Boden [chief 
UN representative] and I asked him to send a UN patrol to the lower zone of the 
Kodori Gorge [controlled by Abkhazia] and the Tqvarcheli district [in Abkhazia] 
where separatists and the Russians, as well as mercenaries, have been 
amassing. They are heavily armed and have armored vehicles and other 
hardware, including artillery, with them. They are engaged in serious 
preparations," Baramidze said. The goals of this buildup transcend the Kodori 
Gorge. "The principal aim is to destabilize the situation throughout Georgia and 
even, if you will, the overthrow of the existing authorities, which obviously will 
cause chaos. We may or may not like the authorities but when an outside enemy 
is the issue, the whole of Georgia should unite," Baramidze added. (GEORGIAN 
TELEVISION, 20 Apr 02; BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Ukrainian peacekeepers? 
The possibility of making the peacekeepers in Abkhazia a truly CIS force, i.e., 
including contingents from other CIS countries, has been broached repeatedly in 
recent years. Current instability makes such initiatives more urgent. The 
possibility of including Ukrainian peacekeepers was discussed at a meeting in 
Kyiv during the 23 April visit of Georgian parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze. 
Burjanadze emphasized that Ukraine has been a reliable friend to Georgia and 
could participate in the peacekeeping. His Ukrainian counterpart, Ivan Plyushch, 
expressed the hope that the CIS would initiate roundtables or other diplomatic 
avenues for settling the conflict. (UKRAINE FIRST TELEVISION, 23 Apr 02; 
BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) According to ITAR-TASS, the 
Ukrainian foreign minister, Anatoly Zlenko, sounded slightly more enthusiastic, 
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saying Ukraine would consider this request. (ITAR-TASS, 25 Apr 02; BBC, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Michael Donahue 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
At the (Silk) Crossroads of history 
While the Bush administration has been carefully setting the conditions for 
prolonged presence in Central Asia since 11 September, Russia and China have 
been attempting to counter, or at least to temper, the growing American influence 
in the region. Kazakhstan, with its significant energy reserves, important strategic 
location, more favorable demographics, and relatively low Islamic fundamentalist 
population, seems the logical target for American statesmen in crafting mutually 
beneficial bilateral agreements. The United States, however, is not alone in the 
competition for Central Asian hegemony; it has Russia, China, and now Iran with 
which to contend. 
 
For more than a half-century Central Asia served as the southern doormat for 
Russia and the Soviet Union. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent 
collapse of the socio-economic farce that was Communism, however, many 
Central Asian states, such as Kazakhstan, have sought to distance themselves 
from Moscow and its influence. The war on terror and the region's newfound 
geopolitical influence have provided Kazakhstan and others with just that 
opportunity. 
 
In the midst of a veritable influence vacuum, Kazakhstan finds itself courted not 
just by America, but by a newly revived Sino-Iranian relationship. In an attempt to 
counter America's growing presence in Central Asia, Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin visited Iran last week, pledging cooperation in a number of areas and 
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reminiscing about the cordial Sino-Iranian relations of the "Silk Road" that bound 
the two, through Central Asia, more than 2,000 years ago. While the visit did 
include the signing of a cooperative agreement on a broad range of issues, 
including oil, trade and transportation, more than anything else it demonstrated 
that each is very concerned about the growing influence of the US in the area 
separating the two states. (MIDDLE EAST, 1301 GMT, 20 Apr 02; BBC World 
Service, via www.bbc.co.uk) 
 
It cannot be a coincidence that less than six days after President Zemin visited 
Tehran, and a few days before US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was 
due to arrive in Kazakhstan, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami traveled to 
the country to voice his concern over the presence of US troops in Central Asia, 
calling it a "humiliation." The US ought to be concerned about Tehran's increased 
muscle-flexing in Kazakhstan. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 26 Apr 02; via Eurasianet) 
Already President Nursultan Nazarbaev has entertained the idea of building an 
oil pipeline through Turkmenistan to Iran, which would be in direct competition 
with the planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and (presumably) exclude the possibility 
of American investment and profit. The plan itself, however, is likely little more 
than a pipe dream (no pun intended) without major American or European 
investment and construction. Considering that the US and the EU are deeply 
involved with Baku-Ceyhan, and with the Caspian Oil Consortium to a lesser 
extent, the discussion is more important as a symbol of Iranian discontent than a 
true alternative. 
 
America, for its part, seems intent on solidifying it relations with Almaty quickly. 
According to the US State Department, US Ambassador to Kazakhstan Larry 
Napper recently presented representatives from the Committee for National 
Security (KNB) with five crates of equipment as a substantive sign of America's 
commitment to the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) 
Program. More important than the symbolic transfer of assistance, however, 
Kazakhstan also has sent over 200 security force members to the United States 
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to participate in ATA training, in exercises ranging from five days to five weeks. 
(US PRESS STATEMENT, 11 Apr 02; via www.state.gov) Furthermore, the US 
officially declared that Kazakhstan is now a "market economy," which, despite 
the admitted presence of corruption, opens the door for increased US investment 
and trade, and possibly acceptance into the World Trade Organization. 
(ECONOMY, 26 Mar 02; via www.globe.kz) 
 
If one accepts the fact that Russia, China, and Iran have joined American in a 
zero-sum "Great Game" for Central Asia, then, given the substantive support that 
the US has provided Nazarbaev's regime -- including raising the country's 
economic status and essentially giving it a pass in the State Department's Annual 
Report on Human Rights -- one must conclude that America is in the game to win 
and the others are simply playing catch-up. Is a theoretical Kazakh-Turkmen-
Iranian pipeline, thus far devoid of details, a true alternative to either Baku-
Ceyhan or an expanded Caspian Pipeline Consortium? Can China, which is 
sparsely populated along its Central Asian borders and still building up military or 
economic power projection, limit Kazakh westernization through rhetoric alone? 
Thus far the answers to both questions seems to be "no." 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
NATO-Russian relations do not deter the Baltics 
There has always been the possibility that NATO's sensitivity to Russian 
concerns would cause the Baltic states to be excluded from the next round of 
alliance membership expansion. Given the size and power of the Russian 
military, not to mention the historical enmity of Russia, the very idea of being 
excluded from NATO membership because of geographic location has irritated 
many Baltic politicians. Estonian MP Toomas Hendrick Ilves once noted that 
leaving countries out of NATO due to Russian concerns is "flawed both morally 
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and intellectually. Morally, because it gives what I would call vampire status to 
one of the most despicable and repugnant regimes ever, the Soviet Union. 
Vampire, because it is dead, yet it lives on in the form of its erstwhile and 
unrecognized borders." (MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 7 May 99; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) That frustration among Baltic politicians continues. 
 
With the impending formation of the NATO-Russia Council, fear of potential 
NATO-Russian animosity developing over the Baltic region has been greatly 
diminished. Instead, cooperation rather than animosity may empty NATO 
expansion of its purpose: Given the proposed changes, the Baltic states may find 
themselves about to join an alliance that no longer provides the firm territorial 
guarantees of collective defense but rather the obscure protection of a collective 
security organization. 
 
The particulars of the new NATO-Russia council will not be finalized until the May 
Reykjavik Summit but the working draft includes a broad swath of issues ranging 
from crisis management and peace support operations to joint management of 
airspace. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 23 Apr 02; via lexis-nexis) Although the 
proposed arrangement does not afford Russia a veto on enlargement or a role in 
the collective defense aspect of NATO, the proposed changes cannot be 
encouraging for the Baltic states, which have viewed NATO as a shield against a 
possible resurgent Russia. 
 
The Baltic states have long been concerned about Russia's intentions. According 
to former Estonian President Lennart Meri, although each country is free to 
choose its own security organizations and structures, "the small Baltic States still 
fear the might of their former Russian rulers." (DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 
1157 CET, 26 Jul 01; via lexis-nexis) Given Russia's haphazard commitment to 
democratic reform, the eastern borders of the Baltic states remain open to 
renewed Russian imperialism. 
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Since achieving independence in 1991, the Baltic states have sought security 
guarantees from NATO in order to reduce that vulnerability. Because details of 
the impending NATO-Russia Council have not been finalized, the Baltic leaders 
have declined to comment extensively on the topic. Instead they have chosen to 
focus on reducing future uncertainty by improving military preparedness and 
reiterating their willingness to join the alliance. 
 
After Estonia submitted its Membership Action Plan (MAP) to NATO, Prime 
Minister Siim Kallas noted the continued development of the Estonian Rapid 
Reaction Battalion (ESBAT), which is expected to be ready for service in 2005. 
(MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESS RELEASE, 8 Apr 02) ESBAT would 
form a core for Estonian assistance to NATO in a variety of operations ranging 
from peace support to territorial defense in accordance with NATO's Article V. By 
developing ESBAT as a rapid reaction unit, Estonia is ensuring that its military 
development conforms to the new strategic concept for NATO, which 
emphasizes rapid deployment forces over large, standing armies that would take 
time to mobilize. 
 
Lithuania, like Estonia, also presented its review of the Membership Action Plan 
to NATO. In preparation for the presentation, Vilnius rushed to pass its National 
Security Strategy so that the Lithuanian representatives meeting in Brussels 
could show that all domestic legal obstacles had been overcome. (BNS, 1459 
GMT, 22 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0422, via World News Connection) Now all 
criteria for membership have been met. Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius 
subsequently hinted at the inevitability of accession when he noted that it had 
been suggested that Lithuania should begin to consider possible areas of 
specialization after admittance. (FINANCIAL TIMES INFORMATION, 25 Apr 02; 
BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis). He did not specify who had made the 
suggestion. In fact, Linkevicius is driving Lithuania toward specialization sooner 
rather than later. 
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For the time being, the Baltic states seem to accept the premise that, although 
NATO is changing, its core function of collective defense will remain, and with it 
the protection of the members' territorial integrity. At a recent conference 
between the Baltic defense ministers and their German counterpart, Rudolf 
Scharping, they were reassured that, despite political maneuvering, NATO will 
not lose sight of its primary purpose: maintaining the military capacity to provide 
Europe's security guarantee. (BNS, 0805 GMT, 16 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0416, via World News Connection) 
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